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THE LEGAL BASIS FOR A SOUTHERN UNIVERSITYINTERSTATE AGREEMENTS WITHOUT
CONGRESSIONAL ASSENT
By jo M.

FERGUSON*

September, 1949, marked the beginning of an extensive program
of higher education on a regional basis, in which twelve Southern
States have so far become active participants.' The necessity for an
expanded educational program in the South in the professional and
graduate fields became increasingly apparent with the influx of returning veterans into the colleges after the war. The South was more
than ever dependent upon institutions in other regions for the training of its leaders in many fields, with the inevitable result that many
of these potential leaders were lost to Southern States.2 And yet the
Southern States were faced with the prospect that the establishment
of the requisite number and quality of graduate and professional
schools by each one of them would not only be beyond their mdividual means, but would result in wasteful duplication. 3 The answer
was the regional approach, which had4 been advocated by various
educators and statesmen for some years.
At the instance of the Conference of Southern Governors, meeting
in Asheville, North Carolina, on October, 1947, a compact was drawn
up, which was signed by the Governors early in 1948.5 This compact0
provides for a Board of Control consisting of the Governor and three
members from each participating State. The Board is authorized to
establish and operate regional universities, but its policy has been to
use and strengthen existing public and private institutions by contracting with them to accept a certain number of students from each
State participating in the particular graduate or professional course
A. B., LL. B.,
* Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky.
nihersity of Kentucky.
'Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia; I Regional Action
In

Higher Education (1949) No. 3.

"Regional Cooperation in Higher Education. a Report of the Board of Control
for Southern Regional Education, Atlanta, Georgia, July, 1949, pp. 7-8.
" Id. at 9.

Dodd, Interstate Compacts, 70 U. S. L. REv. 557. 572, n. 17 (1936); Note (1948)
13 Mo. L. Rev. 286, 287- Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judictar , U S. Senate. 80th Congress. 2nd Session, on S. J. Res. 191, Statement of

Holland. p. 4, and of Gov. Caldwell, p. 18.
.Snpm. n. 2. pp. 1-2.
"For complete text, see Note (1948) 13 Mo. L. Rev. 286, 298.
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being supplied by the contracting school.7 Courses offered for the
school year 1948-1949 included only medicine, dentistry, and veterinary medicine." The Board appoints a permanent staff to direct the
program, and this and other costs are met from appropriations made
by the participating States.
It was at first proposed to secure the assent of Congress to the
compact, and resolutions were introduced in both the Senate and
House of Representatives to give Congressional approval. The House
passed its resolution, 9 but after extensive hearings, the Senate took
no action.
The Problem of Congressional Assent
A question is raised, therefore, as to the validity of the compact,
in view of the requirement of Article I, Section 10, Clause 3, of the

Constitution, that "No State shall, without the consent of Congress
"
enter into any agreement or compact with another State
This clause, when read alone and out of context, would seem to
prohibit any sort of contractual relationship between two States, and
this interpretation has not been without proponents, especially during
the uncritically centralizationist period between the two World Wars.
Thus, it has been said that the position holding that not all interstate
agreements require Congressional assent, extends a "judicial gloss on
the words of the compact clause," and "such a result is unwarranted,
for the Constitution requires Congressional consent to any interstate
compact or agreement."i s Another writer says, "Judicial authority
for this position consists, however, of the repetition of an erroneous
dictum in Virginia v Tennessee, and a group of cases in state courts,
which either involve no interstate transactions, or are concerned with
no state promise or grant."" One authority, stressing the desirability
and convenience of compacts entered into without the cumbersome
requirement of consent, advocates "restoration" of this power to the
States by Constitutional amendment. 12 Also "the plain words of the
all compacts require
Constitution mean what they say and
consent."13
7Supra, n. 2, p. 4; see also I Regional Action in Higher Education (1949)
p. 4.
No. 2,
8
Supra, n. 2, p. 15.
Note 13 Mo. L. Rev. 286, 287 n. 6 (1948); 94 Cong. Rec. 5407 (1948).
10Note, 45 YALE L. J. 324 (1935).
n Note, 35 CoL. L. REV. 76 (1935).
'- Carman, Should The States Be Permitted To Make Compacts Without the
Consent of Congress, 23 CORN. L. Q. 280 (1938).
1Note 34 VA. L. R v. 64, 66 (1948); see also note 35 HAmv. L. REV. 322 (1922);
and opinion of U. S. Attorney General's office, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of
the Committee on the Judiciary, supra, n. 4, at p. 58, holding that Congressional
consent is necessary.
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Many Agreements Already Exist Without Assent
In the face of all these broadsides against coordinated interstate
action and responsibility, it is somewhat surprising to find that states
and their agencies have been entering into all sorts of agreements and
compacts with each other, entirely disregarding this allegedly rigid
Constitutional requirement. It is doubtful if the ordinary state official,
conferring with his colleague in a neighboring state on reciprocal
legislation or some mutual problem, is ever aware that each time he
agrees with his confere, he is violating the Constitution of the United
States in the eyes of the centralizationist school.
And yet agreements, oral and written, formal and informal, have
been made between our States since the Constitution came into existence, without one having been declared invalid by the Supreme
Court for lack of Congressional assent. In an article by Frankfurter
and Landis, "The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in
Interstate Adjustments' 4 eleven interstate agreements made without
any congressional act of assent are listed, some of which have been
expressly approved by the Supreme Court. Dodd states that there
are seventeen compacts which, having been ratified by the States,
have been put into operation although they have never received the
consent of Congress.i- Even at an early date in our Constitutional
history, the authority of one State to contribute money to a project
carried through by another state for their joint benefit, was not
questioned. 16 These lists of agreements which became operative
without assent were almost certainly incomplete when compiled, even
if we include only agreements resulting from or recognized by formal
legislative action. If reciprocal laws, jointly supported organizations,
and executive agreements and contracts are included, the number of
congressionally unrecognized agreements between States will run into
the hundreds. Reciprocal legislation is certainly an "agreement" of
a sort betveen States, one of which "agrees", for instance, to recognize
a license issued by another, in return for the latter's agreement of a
m
T
Chief Justice Taney is authority for the idea that
similar nature.I
11:34 YALL L. J. 685, 749 (1925).
r Dodd, Interstate Compacts 70 U. S. L. REv. 557 562 (1936).
"Abel, Interstate CooperationAs a Child, 32 IowA L. REI,. 203, 216 (1947), ctng 1 Dig. La. Acts 558 (1804-1827) for the statement that contributions for the
opening of the navigation of the Pearl River were being made by Mississippi.
"See Carman, Should The States Be Permitted To Make Compacts Without
The Consent of Congress. 23 CORN. L. Q. 280, 282 (1938), n. 7, for the opinion that
a Minnesota law "reciprocally permitting citizens of adjoining states and of adjoining Canadian provinces to operate their motor vehicles tax free-if like privileges-are extended to Minnesota vehicle owners," is probably unconstitutional,
wiithout the consent of Congress.
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even the extradition of a criminal is an agreement, and for the proposition that:
"The word agreement' does not necessarily import any
direct and express stipulation; nor is it necessary that it should be
in writing. If there is a verbal understanding to which both parties
have assented, and upon which both are acting, it is an 'agreement'....

The number of unapproved agreements has enormously increased
during the very years in which writers for legal periodicals have almost unanimously construed the "compact" clause most strictly
Perhaps the greatest expansion has occurred in the field of interstate organizations jointly supported and sponsored by the several
States. Chief among these is the Council of State Governments,O a
self-styled "joint governmental agency established by the States, for
The Council is
service to the States, supported by the States.
composed of Commissions or Committees on Interstate Cooperation
Legislation establishing
established in each of the 48 States.
these commissions provides that 'The Council of State Governments
is hereby declared to be a joint governmental agency of this State and
of the other States which cooperate through it' ".0 Despite the fact
that this organization has been in existence since 1925,21 apparently
no attack has ever been made on the constitutionality of the appropriation acts of the various States, or their acts authorizing participation, on the ground that Congress has never assented to its formation
or existence.

22

Still in the field of jointly supported organizations, it would appear
that Utah and Wyoming already incarcerate their women prisoners
in Colorado, 23 and that a model act has been prepared for adoption
by interested western States authorizing the State authority in the
field of prisons to contract with any other State for the detention and
care of female prisoners during the term of their imprisonment.24 This act was prepared as a means of avoiding the use of the
formal, Congressionally approved, compact, and as a part of the
Holmes v. Jennson, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 540, 572, 10 L. Ed. 579, 595 (1840).
Caldwell, Interstate CooperationIn River Basin Development, 32 Iowa L. REv.
282, 236 (1947).
"'The Book of the States, 1948-1949, p. 10.
'

21

Id. at 3.

2eBut see Parker v. Riley, 18, Cal. 2d 83, 113 P 2d 873, 134 A. L. R. 1405 (19-11),
in which the constitutionality of the act establishing the California Commission on
Interstate Cooperation (the body charged with furthering the State's participation
as a member of the Council) was attacked on another ground. The act was upheld.
In the A. L. R. annotation, supra, at p. 1412, the annotator states: "That the prohibition of Art. 1, Sec. 10, cl. 3, has been construed as referring only to political
alliances tending to encroach upon the supremacy of the United States--"
23Western Regional Office, Council of State Governments, Report of the Western Interstate Committee on Institutional Care 1946-1948, p. 5.
2 Id.
at 8, Appendix A.
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agreement, the "host" State proposed to adopt a statute admitting
women prisoners from outside the State on a "tuition" basis. 2 5
One of the most successful interstate agreements has been the
Palisades Interstate Park Agreement between New York and New
Jersey This agreement was ratified by the legislature of the two
States in 1900, and the organization functioned without Congressional
assent until 1937 The agreement was readopted by each of the
States in 1937 as a formal compact, this time with Congressional
2
approval. "1
Nation-wide organizations of officials, state agencies, and municipal
and other local governmental units are too numerous to trace. Many
of them involve some contractual aspect, or governmental financing,
and certainly represent "agreements" within Chief Justice Taney's
definition of the term.27 A recognition of common regional interests
is increasing, and governmental agencies are being formed to give
practical effect to this recognition. At least one instance has been
noted in which a Canadian province is included in a regional associattion apparently formed for the purpose of attracting the tourist
trade.2 8

Such Agreements Have Long Been Recognized by the Courts
The courts of the United States and of the several States have long
recognized the possibility of valid agreements between States made
without Congressional consent, or at least without express consent.
Undoubtedly the lealing case on this point is Virginia v Tennessee,29
which was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1893.
This was a suit to establish the boundary line between the two States,
and the decision turned on the validity of a compact made between
them in 1803, without Congressional assent. The Court upheld the
compact, and in its opinion discussed the meaning and effect of the
,compact clause" of the Constitution at some length, very logically
"Id. at 6.

'The Book of the States, 1948-1949, p. 30.
Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 10 L. Ed. 579 (U. S. 1840). These intergovernmental, interstate, cooperative projects are growing in number; in the educational field, for example, a most recent proposal is to establish a school to train
police officers of the Southern States at the University of Louisville, a municipal
institution (The Louisville, Ky., Courier-Journal,Oct. 11, 1948, Section 2, page 3,
column 3).
"Pacific Northwest Associated, an organization which dispenses travel folders,
among other things, and advertises the attractions of the region, under the joint
sponsorship of the Washington State Advertising Commission, the Oregon State
Highway Commission, and the British Columbia Government Travel Bureau;
Holiday Magazine, November, 1949, pp. 12-13.
1,18 U. S. 503, 37 L. Ed. 537 (1893).
-'
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demolishing as an "absurdity" the contention that no valid agreement

is possible without Congressional approval:
"The terms 'agreement' or 'compact' taken by themselves
are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all forms of stipulation,
written or verbal, and relating to all lands of subjects; to those to
which the United States can have no possible objection or have any
interest in interfering with, as well as to those which may tend to
increase and build up the political influence of the contracting states,
so as to encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States
or interfere with their rightful management of particular subjects
placed under their entire" control.
There are many matters upon which different states may
agree that can in no respect concern the United States. If, for instance, Virginia should come into possession and ownership of a
small parcel of land in New York which the latter state might desire
to acquire as a site for a public building, it would hardly be deemed
essential for the latter state to obtain the consent of Congress before
it could make a valid agreement with Virginia for the purchase of
the land. If Massachusetts, in forwarding its exhibits to the World's
Fair at Chicago, should desire to transport them a part of the distance over the Erie Canal, it would hardly be deemed essential for
that state to obtain the consent of Congress before it could contract
with New York for the transportation of the exhibit through that
state in that way. If the bordering line of two states should cross
some malarious and disease producing district, there could be no
possible reason, or any conceivable public grounds, to obtain the
consent of Congress for the bordering states to agree to unite in
draining the district, and thus remove the cause of disease. So in
case of threatened invasion of cholera, plague, or other causes of
sickness and death, it would be the height of absurdity to hold that
the threatened states could not unite in providing means to prevent
and repel the invasion of the pestilence without obtaining the consent
of Congress, which might not be at the time in session. If, then, the
terms compact' or agreement' in the Constitution do not apply to
every possible compact or agreement between one state and another,
for the validity of which the consent of Congress must be obtained,
to what compacts or agreements does the Constitution apply?
We can only reply by looking at the object of the constitutional provision and constrmng the terms 'agreement' and 'compact' by reference to it. It is a familiar rule in the construction of
terms to apply to them the meaning naturally attaching to them
from their context. Noscitur a sociis is a rule of construction applicable to all written instruments. Where any particular word is
obscure or of a doubtful meaning, taken by itself, its obscurity or
doubt may be removed by reference to associated words. And the
meaning of a term may be enlarged or restrained by reference to
the object of the whole clause in which it is used.
Looking at the clause in which the terms 'compact' or
eement " appear, it is evident that the prohibition is directed to
e formation of any combination tending to the increase of political
power in the states, which may encroach upon or interfere with the
just supremacy of the United States.' u
30Id. at 517, 37 L. Ed. at 542.
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It is true that the Court went on to say that consent may be inplied,
and could be implied m this case from long recognition by the federal
31
authorities of the territorial divisions established by the compact.

Nevertheless, the quoted passage in the opinion has been so frequently
and so favorably mentioned or quoted in succeeding cases3 2 as to leave
little doubt that it represents the settled opinion of the Court. As

recently as 1920 we find the Court inviting two states to solve a particularly vexing problem cooperatively, and no mention is made of
33
congressional approval.
Virgia v Tennessee was decided more than one hundred years
after the adoption of the Constitution, but it was not decided as an

entirely new question. The boundary line established by the VirginiaTennessee compact had been recognized by the Supreme Court as
early as 1818, though there was no discussion or argument concerning
the right of the States to agree upon their boundary by compact.34 Five
years later, in the case of Green v Biddle,35 the decision turned on the
validity of a Kentucky act which was contrary to the KentuckyVirginia compact under which Kentucky was authorized to seek admission into the Union. Clay, as amicus curiae, argued mnsupport of
the Kentucky statute in much the same terms used by present day
proponents of the "assent" requirement, saying:
"Both by the original act of confederation and the existing national constitution, the States are prohibited from treating or
contracting with each other, without the consent of Congress. The
terms of the prohibition in the constitution are very strong.
It extends to all agreements or compacts, no matter what is the subject of them. It is immaterial, therefore, whether that subject be
harmless or dangerous to the Union.
In the present case, there is no pretense for alleging a subsequent

express assent. Was there a prior one? The act of Virgnia did not
even profess to ask the consent of Congress to the compact.
The
act of February 4, 1791, (by which alone the will of Congress on
this subject is signified) merely declares the consent of that body to
the erecting of the District of Kentucky into a separate and ' rndependent state, and its reception into the Union on a certain day."

Despite tbis argument, the Court held the compact valid and bmd.11
Id. at 522, 37 L. Ed. at 544.
"' North Carolina v. Tennessee, 235 U. S. 1, 15, 59 L. Ed. 97, 103 (1914); Stearns
v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, 45 L. Ed. 162 (1900); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1,
17, 44 L. Ed. 347, 354 (1899); Wharton v. Wise, 53 U. S. 155, 168, 38 L. Ed. 669, 675
(1893). See also St. Louis & S. F Rwy. Co. v. James, 161 U. S.545, 562, 40 L. Ed.
s02, 808 (1896); Stevenson v. Fain, 116 Fed. 147 (CCA 1902); Belding v. Hebrard, 103
Fed 532, 542 (CAA 1900).
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S.296, 65 L. Ed. 937 (1920).
-"Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat, 212, 4 Ld. Ed. 372 (U. S. 1818).
s8 Wheat 1, 5 L. Ed. 547 (U. S. 1823).
I"d. at 39, 5 L. Ed. at 557.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

ing on Kentucky, on the ground that it had been communicated to
Congress, and that body had impliedly assented to it by admitting
Kentucky to the Urnon.
In Barren v Baltimore,37 Chief Justice Marshall recognized the
purpose of the constitutional restriction on the States' compact powers
to be to 'restrain State legislation on subjects intrusted to the general
government." 38 The opinion in Rhode Island v Massachusetts contains dictum to the effect that the intent of the compact clause was to
give Congress "the power of dissenting to such compacts
to
guard against the derangement of their federal relations with other
39
States of the Union and the federal government
The decision of the State courts upholding the power of the States
to enter into agreements with each other without Congressional assent,
are numerous and unequivocal, and date from an early period right
40
up to very recent cases.
The only Supreme Court case containing contrary dictum is Holmes
v ennson,4 1 a case involving the extradition of a criminal from Vermont to Canada. The highest court of Vermont had approved the
extradition proceedings, and on appeal the Supreme Court was equally
divided, in consequence of which the writ of error was dismissed.
However, Chief Justice Taney, whose opinion in this case has already
been quoted in this paper, gave a very broad interpretation to the
meaning of the word "agreement" as used in the compact clause, indicating that the restriction applied to any sort of agreement, oral
or written ,formal or informal. Nevertheless, it would appear that
his opinion was actually based upon the theory that all powers relating
to foreign intercourse were confided to the general movement, and
3- 7 Pet. 243, 8 L. Ed. 672 (U. S. 1833). For an opinion upholding the rights of
the States, as sovereign units, to enter into agreements and compacts suihJect to
constitutional restrictions, see Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Pet. 185, 9 L. Ed. 680 (U. S. 1837).
",Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. at 249, 8 L. Ed. at 674.
90 12 Pet. 657 726, 9 L. Ed. 1233, 1261 (U. S. 1838).
4 Parker v. Riley, 18 Cal. 2d 83, 113
P 2d 873, 134 A. L. R. 1405 (1911);
Mackay v. N. Y., N. H., & H. R. Co., 82 Conn. 73, 72 At. 583 (1909); Union Branch
Rwy. Co. v. E. Tenn. & Ga. R. Co., 14 Ga. 327 (1853); Reeves v. Deisenroth, 288 Ky.
724, 157 S. AV 2d 331 (1941); Dixie Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Martin, 278 Ky. 705,
129 S. W 2d 181 (1939); Fisher v. Steele, 39 La. Ann 447, 1 So. 882 (1887); McHenry
County v. Brady, 37 N. Dak. 59, 163 N. W 540 (1917); Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge,
17 N. H. 200 (1845); Russell v. Am. Assn., 139 Tenn. 124, 201 S. W 151 (1918);
Searsburg v. Woodford, 76 V t. 370, 57 At. 961 (1904). See also 2 STORY, CONISMENrARIES ON THE CONSTIUTION Sec. 1402, 1403 (5th ed. 1891); WARREN, Tur SUPREIr
COURT AND THE SOVEREIGN STATES 75 (1924); 1 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAwV OF THE U. S. Sec. 172, pp. 307-309 (2nd ed. 1929); and 59 C. J STATES, Sec.
11 (2) et seq.
4114
Pet. 540, 10 L. Ed. 579 (U. S. 1840); for a criticis i of this dictum, see
Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause ol /he Consti: 'on -a Sluds in Inter.
state Adjustments, 34 YALE L. J. 685, at 752, Appendix 11. 258 (1925).
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that the Governor of Vermont was engaging in the conduct of foreign
42
relations when he agreed to the extradition of a fugitive to Canada.
This view of the Taney opinion was adopted and approved by the
Court some years later in U S. v Rauscher 43 However, the view is
still held in some quarters that some agreements of a contractual nature may be made by individual States with foreign governments or
44
their subdivisions.
Types of Interstate Agreements
Even those who would uphold the principle that Congressional
assent is necessary to every interstate agreement very often tacitly
admit of exceptions, apparently without any realization of inconsistency Thus, one who says that "the plain words of the Constitution
mean what they say," admits that transactions between States of a
contractual nature do not require consent if they are such as could
be performed by midividuals.'
This would seem to place the author
in the extraordinary position of saying that a contract is not an agreement. Again, it is said that acquiescence of one State in the acts of
another within the former's borders will not constitute an agreement,
and immediately thereafter, that the compact clause applies in terms
to all "consensual transactions" between States. 46 It is difficult to see
how the performance of an act by one sovereign within the territory
of another, with the latter's knowledge and acquiescence, can fail of
comprehension within the term "consensual transaction"
Perhaps the reason for this inconsistency lies in the difficulty involved in classification. The possibilities are so multitudinous that
an exact classification is probably impossible. In very general terms,
however, interstate agreements could be said to fall into three classes:
1. Compacts and agreements ratified by legislative action of the
States made party thereto;
2. Reciprocal legislation;
3. Executive agreements and contracts.
The first classification would certainly include all written compacts
formally e- terect into as such and adopted by the legislatures of the
participatii.g states, and assented to by Congress. It would include
-"Id. at 570, 10 L. Ed. at 594.
' 119 U. S.. 407, 30 L. Ed. 425 (1886).
" McHenry County v. Brady, 37 N. Dak. 59, 163 N. IV 540 (1917); Bruce, The
Compact€ and Agreements of States With One Another And With Foreign Powers,
2MINN. L. Rl%,. 500 (1918).

', Note, 34 VA. L. REv. 64 (1948).
" Note 35 COL. L. REv. 76, 77 (1935).
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much more, however. Organizations jointly established and operated
by two or more States, and authorized by their legislatures, and supported by legislative appropriations, must also be included, whether
or not Congress has ever consented to their establishment. Agreements establishing boundary lines are included, and here it is certain
that such agreements, even though not expressly approved by Congress, may become binding on the States concerned, so that one State
47
may not withdraw by unilateral action.
The second general classification suggested, reciprocal legislation,
is self-explanatory It is to be distinguished from the first class of
legislative agreements mentioned, in that it does not involve agreements with specific States by its terms, but usually awards some
privilege to citizens of any other State which will award a like privilege to citizens of the State enacting the law Even this is an
"agreement" within Chief Justice Taney's definition, and such legisla48
tion has been questioned as violative of the compact clause.
Executive agreements and contracts are made almost daily by
various departmental officials or officials of subordinate political subdivisions. They are sometimes oral, but may also include written
agreements. They are none the less "agreements" because they are
not adopted formally by the legislatures of the States involved, if the
officials concerned are authorized to make them. It is necessary to
recognize their existence, although those who have undertaken to
complie lists of interstate agreements or compacts have very under4
standably omitted them from consideration. 9

Possible Exceptions to "Consent" Requirement
It would appear from the preceding discussion, therefore, that as
a matter of practice numerous agreements have been made between
and among states and their subdivisions without express congressional
consent, and that even those writers who would most strictly construe
the constitutional restriction, tacitly acknowledge certain exceptions.
The theories advanced to permit these exceptions include:
1. Consent implied from some Congressional act recognizing a
situation resulting from a compact;
'47 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 5031, 37 L. Ed. 537 (1893).
,Carman,

Should The States Be Permitted To Make Compacts Without The

Consent of Congress, 23 Coi, . L. Q. 280, 282 n. 7 (1938).
41 For lists of interstate compacts, see Bruce, The Compacts And Agreements Of
States With One Another And With Foreign Powers 2 MINN. L. REv. 500 (1918);
Dodd, Interstate Compacts, 70 U. S. L. REv. 557 (1936); Frankfurter and
Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study tn InterstateAdjustments,
34 YALE L. J. 685 (1925); BooK OF THE STATES (Council of State Governments 19481949) 28 (for compacts between 1934-1947).
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2. Consent implied from acquiescence over a long period;
3. A compact is valid until disapproved by some affirmative action
of Congress (this is practically the same as the preceding);
4. Agreements involving governmental functions require consent,
but ordinary business transactions between States do not;
5. Agreements on purely state problems do not require consent.
The "implied consent" doctrine receives support in the leading case
of Virginia v Tennessee, in which the Court said that Congress impliedly consented to the boundary compact because the division of
territory established thereby was recognized in the election or appointment of federal officials whose assignments and duties encompassed
territory to the state borders.,
Upon closer examination, however,
this doctrine is open to the objection that it is capricious, as the
"consent" is as likely as not to be included by some inadvertent and
merely incidental mention in a statute on an entirely different matter.
Besides, many agreements, particularly executive agreements, are
already in operation for which no implied consent could be found m
any Congressional act.
Consent implied from long acquiescence is slightly less objectionable, but would obviously raise a question as to the date when the
compact actually becomes valid.
The theory that a compact is valid until disapproved by Congress
received support in St. Louis & San Francisco Rwy. v James,"i which
involved a railroad organized under the laws of one State which, with
the consent of that State, accepted certain additional authority from
another State. There the Court said: "Such legislation on the part
of two or more states is not, in the absence of inhibitory legislation
by Congress, regarded as within the Constitutional prohibition of
agreements or compacts between states."52
The distinction between agreements involving governmental functions and those concerning ordinary business transactions does not
appear to have any basis in the Constitution. A State is a sovereignty,
not a municipal corporation.
Finally, the theory is advanced that agreements between States
which involve matters of State responsibility only do not require any
Congressional assent at all, either express or implied. The dictum
already quoted in Virginia v Tennessee (if dictum it is), and the
"11.18

U. S. at 522, 37 L. Ed. at 544.
161 U. S. 545, 40 L. Ed. 802 (1896).
12Id. at 562, 40 L. Ed. 808.
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numerous cases approving it, 53 strongly urge this view, as do most of
the cases in the State courts.54 Basically this is the same view taken
by Judge Bruce when he says that compacts which increase or decrease political power are void without consent, but all others are
voidable merely 55 This last statement may go too far, however.
There would appear to be no sound reason for permitting Congress
to declare an agreement void out of mere caprice, but it could undoubtedly prohibit any agreement, which in its opinion, increased the
State's political power to a major degree, or invaded the federal
domain.
When the Constitution is considered as a whole, together with its
historical background and the careful reservation of powers to the
States, it is impossible to believe that it was the intent of the framers
to do more than prevent dangerous political combinations among the
states. Certainly a generation which has seen executive agreements,
joint resolutions, and simple acts of Congress substitute for treaties
in our foreign affairs, should have no difficulty in interpreting the compact clause to require Congressional assent only for formal political
compacts, or agreements involving the exercise of power concurrently
with the federal government.
The scornful comment of the Louisiana Court when faced with an
objection to the construction of a levee by one State within the borders of another, is indicative of the realities of the situation:
"On reading that objection in connection with the con-

stitutional prohibition just quoted, the rmnd would naturally expect
a charge that the State of Louisiana was projecting a treaty of alliance

with the State of Arkansas, or contemplated some joint scheme of
commercial or industrial enterprise, or perhaps conspiring for the
establishment of a new confederacy; but great is the relief when the
nmnd is informed that the purpose which plaintiff resists with such
a powerful shield is merely to build a piece of levee in the State of
Arkansas, if necessary, and if that state does not object, or consents.
It is, indeed, too clear for argument that such a transaction is no more
a prohibited compact between two states than is contained in the
requisition of one governor for, and the consent of another to, the
capture and arrest of it fugitive from ]ustice."'

Finally, it is submitted that practical necessity urges an mterpretation of the compact clause which will allow the States the greatest
possible freedom in dealing with each other for their common good.
ISupra, n. 32.
"' Supra, n. 40.
r Bruce, The Compacts and Agreements of States With One Another and With
Foreign Powers, 2 'INN. L. Ruv. 500, 516 (1918).
r Fisher v. Steele, 39 La. Ann. 447 454, 1 So. 882, 888 (1887).

INTERSTATE EDUCATIONAL AGREEMENTS

As long as Congress retains the power to declare a "political" compact
inoperative, and the Supreme Court sits as a guardian of federal
prerogatives,.r it is submitted that there is no danger of any misuse
of the States' sovereign powers in their agreements with each other.
"With all our unifying processes nothing is clearer than
that in the United States there are being built up regional interests,
regional cultures, and regional interdependencies. These produce
regional problems calling for regional solutions. Control by the
nation would be ill-conceived and intrusive. A gratuitous burden
would thereby be cast upon Congress and the national admimstration,
both of which need to husband their energies for the discharge of
unequivocably national responsibilities. As to these regional problems
Congress could not legislate effectively. Regional interests, regional
visdom, and regional pride must be looked to for solution.",u

Conclusion
The field of public education having been reserved to the States
by the Constitution as their exclusive responsibility, it is submitted
that the Southern States were acting within the scope of their authority
ii reaching agreements among themselves for the purpose of promoting education by their joint efforts. The compact entered into for this
purpose is valid without Congressional assent.
For the view that the Supreme Court will always uphold the powers of the
government of which it is a part, as against the States, see W.LTSE, JOHN C. CALHOUN,
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NULLiIiIR, 1829-1839.
1 Frankfurter and Landis, supra n. 14, at 708. This article has been cited for
the proposition that all compacts must receive Congressional assent, but it would
,cein to go no further than to set out the method suggested by the Constitution for
adoption of formal compacts, without discussing the possibility of interstate agreeients made solely by State action concerning matters entirely within the responsibility of the States. It presents a very powerful argument in favor of interstate
agreements.

